

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS - FOR AMBASSADOR EILTS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AF

SUBJECT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE, WHEN SADAT WAS IN WASHINGTON IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD STAY IN TOUCH ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS. THERE FOLLOWS FOR YOUR USE WHEN NEXT YOU SEE SADAT, OR FOR USE WITH FAHMY IF YOU DEEM HIM MORE APPROPRIATE, SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA.

2. TALKING POINTS FOLLOW:

ZAIRE:

-- WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE COOPERATION AND DETERMINATION DISPLAYED BY EGYPT, MOROCCO AND OTHER STATES IN SUPPORT OF ZAIRE.

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-- THE ARRIVAL OF THE MOROCCAN FORCE QUICKLY ACHIEVED ITS IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES OF SECURING KOLWEZI, RESTORING THE MORALE OF THE ZAIRIAN TROOPS, AND BOLSTERING PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S POSITION. THE MILITARY SITUATION CONTINUES TO IMPROVE, WITH THE MOROCCANS PERMITTING THE ZAIRIANS TO RECEIVE MOST OF THE CREDIT.

-- WE HAVE HOPED SINCE WE FIRST LEARNED OF THE MOROCCAN DECISION TO ASSIST ZAIRE, THAT THEIR AID WOULD HELP CREATE A MORE BALANCED MILITARY SITUATION SO THAT THE NIGERIAN

MEDIATION EFFORT WOULD HAVE A GREATER CHANCE OF SUCCESS.
THIS NOW APPEARS TO BE THE CASE.

-- IN TRYING TO BRING ZAIRE AND ANGOLA TO THE NEGOTIATING
TABLE TO RESOLVE THEIR MANY DIFFERENCES, NIGERIA HAS
ASSUMED AN ARDUOUS RESPONSIBILITY. IT WILL NEED ALL THE
HELP IT CAN GET FROM INFLUENTIAL GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS EGYPT.

-- WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS SOME FEELING IN AFRICA THAT
THE OAU SHOULD BE MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN EFFORTS TO END
THE FIGHTING IN THE SHABA, AND THERE HAS BEEN TALK OF CON-
VENING AN EXTRAORDINARY OAU SUMMIT MEETING. WE, OF COURSE,
FAVOR ANY DIPLOMATIC MEASURES WHICH WILL QUICKLY END THE
AGGRESSION AGAINST ZAIRE. FRANKLY, WE CAN SEE SOME DANGER
THAT DEBATE ON SUCH A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE AT A LARGE CON-
FERENCE COULD POLARIZE PUBLIC POSITIONS AND MAKE IT MORE
DIFFICULT FOR NIGERIA TO GENERATE IMPARTIAL SUPPORT THROUGH-
OUT AFRICA FOR MEDIATION AND EARLY NEGOTIATIONS. BUT
THESE ARE TACTICAL DECISIONS OF WHICH MEMBERS OF THE OAU
ARE THE BEST JUDGE.

THE HORN:
SOMALIA -

-- IT IS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT SOMALIA'S DISENCHANTMENT
WITH THE SOVIETS OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO FACILITATE
SOVIET DISENGAGEMENT FROM SOMALIA. THE USSR'S SUPPLY OF
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ARMS TO ETHIOPIA APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE CATALYST;

-- WE WILL NEED TO MOVE CAREFULLY. THE PRESENCE OF
SEVERAL THOUSAND SOVIET ADVISORS IN THE MILITARY/SECURITY
APPARATUS AND THROUGHOUT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD MAKE IT
DIFFICULT FOR PRESIDENT SIAD TO SHIFT HIS POLICY, IF
INDEED HE SO DESIRES. IN ADDITION, SOMALIA IS HEAVILY
RELIANT ON SOVIET-SUPPLIED ARMS.

-- MEANWHILE, WE ARE RECEIVING MIXED SIGNALS FROM THE
SOMALIS. ON THE ONE HAND, AMBASSADOR ADDOU, THE SOMALI
AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON, STATING THAT HE WAS ACTING
UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRESIDENT SIAD, HAS SOUGHT
ASSURANCES FROM THE SECRETARY AND VICE PRESIDENT THAT
SOMALIA'S ECONOMIC AND MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE
MET IF SOMALIA ALTERED ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR.
ADDOU WAS TOLD THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO RESUME AN
ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM AND TO SEND A SURVEY TEAM
IMMEDIATELY UPON BEING ASSURED THAT THEY WILL BE
WELCOMED AND GIVEN ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION AND
OFFICIALS THEY NEED, FREE FROM INTERFERENCE BY SOVIET
ADVISORS. HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT WE CANNOT RESPOND
ONE WAY OR ANOTHER ON THE QUESTION OF MILITARY
SUPPLIES UNTIL WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR ARMS TRANSFER

POLICY REVIEW.

-- ON THE OTHER HAND, PRESIDENT SIAD FAILED FOR TWO WEEKS TO ACCEDE TO A REQUEST FROM U.S. AMBASSADOR LOUGHRAN FOR A MEETING TO DISCUSS OUR RELATIONS AND HAS SINCE MADE SEVERAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS REAFFIRMING HIS ADHERENCE TO HIS TIES WITH THE USSR, DESPITE THEIR ARMS SUPPLIES TO ETHIOPIA. WE HOPE THAT AN EARLY SIAD-LOUGHRAN MEETING WILL ENABLE US TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER SIAD'S PUBLIC BEHAVIOR IS DICTATED BY TACTICS OR WHETHER THERE ARE SERIOUS LIMITS TO HOW FAR HE WILL LET HIS DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE SOVIETS TAKE HIM.

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-- WE NONETHELESS BELIEVE THAT COMMENCEMENT OF SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES TO ETHIOPIA PROVIDES THE ELEMENT FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA. IT MAY WELL BE POSSIBLE THAT SOMALIA WILL REDUCE ITS TIES WITH THE SOVIETS AND INCREASE ITS TIES WITH MODERATE ARAB STATES, THE U.S. AND THE WEST IF SUFFICIENT NON-SOVIET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM. WHETHER OR NOT WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE LIMITED AMOUNTS OF ARMS TO SOMALIA, WE WILL BE LOOKING INTO WHAT OTHER NON-SOVIET SOURCES OF ARMS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO SOMALIA.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT A REDUCTION OF OUR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH ETHIOPIA (SEE BELOW) HAS REMOVED THE MAJOR OBSTACLE FOR SOMALIA TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN US-SOMALIA RELATIONS. THE AVOIDANCE BY SOMALIA OF INCIDENTS WHICH MIGHT DISTURB THE TENUOUS PEACE OF THE REGION (E.G., IN DJIBOUTI, THE OGADEN AND KENYA) WOULD HELP US IN PURSUIT OF A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP.

ETHIOPIA -

-- OUR RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA ARE COMING UNDER INCREASING STRAIN AS THE ETHIOPIAN PROVISIONAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT (EPMG) MOVES FURTHER LEFT AND INDICATES THE INTENT TO SUBSTITUTE THE USSR FOR TRADITIONAL US-ETHIOPIAN TIES, INCLUDING THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND MILITARY MATERIEL.

-- ETHIOPIA'S DECEMBER ARMS AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR REFLECTS THE EPMG'S APPARENT DESIRE FOR A MORE IDEOLOGICALLY COMPATIBLE ARMS SUPPLIER. THE START OF DELIVERIES (CONVENTIONAL SMALL ARMS, APC'S AND T-34 TANKS ALREADY HAVE ARRIVED) HAS PERMITTED THE EPMG TO TAKE ACTIONS MORE BLATANTLY HOSTILE TO THE U.S.

-- THE EPMG'S ORDER TO CLOSE AND EXPEL WITHIN ONE WEEK THE
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PERSONNEL OF MAAG, USIS, THE KAGNEW STATION COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY, OUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN ASMARA AND THE NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER DRAMATIZED THE TWO-YEAR DETERIORATION IN OUR RELATIONS.

-- ALTHOUGH THE EPMG HAS NOT OFFERED US ANY FORMAL EXPLANATION FOR THEIR ACTION, THE IMMEDIATE PRECIPITATING CAUSE PROBABLY WAS OUR DELIVERY OF NOTES ON APRIL 20 AND 21. WE NOTIFIED THE EPMG THAT WE WERE HALVING MAAG IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONGRESSIONALLY-MANDATED WORLDWIDE MAAG REDUCTION, AND THAT, TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS HAVING OBIATED THE NEED FOR KAGNEW STATION, WE WISHED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS AS PROVIDED FOR IN OUR BILATERAL AGREEMENT TO CLOSE DOWN KAGNEW BEFORE SEPTEMBER OF THIS YEAR. THE SECRETARY'S FEBRUARY 24 ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WE HAD DECIDED TO TERMINATE MAP MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR ETHIOPIA IN FY 78, IN PART BECAUSE OF ETHIOPIAN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, ALSO WAS A FACTOR.

-- WE HAVE NOT PROVIDED ETHIOPIA WITH LETHAL MILITARY MATERIEL FOR OVER TEN MONTHS AND DELIVERIES OF ALL LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL MILITARY MATERIEL ARE BEING HELD UP PENDING A CAREFUL REVIEW OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

DJIBOUTI -

-- THE US FAVORS AN INDEPENDENT AND VIABLE DJIBOUTI WHICH MAINTAINS GOOD RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA AND OTHER NEIGHBORS AND SERVES THE COMMON INTEREST IN REGIONAL STABILITY.

-- AS AN INDICATION OF OUR CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE FUTURE OF AN INDEPENDENT DJIBOUTI (WHICH WOULD BE ENHANCED BY A CONTINUING FRENCH MILITARY PRESENCE) WE OPENED A CONSULATE GENERAL THERE ON APRIL 25, TO BE RAISED TO AN EMBASSY UPON THE EXPECTED JUNE 27 DATE OF INDEPENDENCE.

SUDAN -

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-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF OUR TIES WITH THE SUDAN.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S AGREEMENT TO SELL THE 6 C-130'S TO THE SUDAN (WHICH WE EXPECT CONGRESS TO APPROVE).

IS A CONCRETE MANIFESTATION OF THAT INTENT. ONCE FAVORABLE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF THE C-130'S SALE IS COMPLETED, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER OTHER SUDANESE REQUESTS FOR LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE ARMS.

3. IF APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY ARISES, YOU MIGHT ALSO MAKE FOLLOWING POINT RE SCOPE OF OUR ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN

SUPPORT OF MODERATE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS:

-- ASIDE FROM ZAIRE AND THE HORN, THE U.S. IS SUPPORTING MODERATE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. IN THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR WE ARE RESPONDING TO THE REQUESTS OF KENYA, LIBERIA, SENEGAL AND GABON FOR CREDIT TO PURCHASE MILITARY EQUIPMENT. IN THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR WE PLAN TO ADD CAMEROON TO THE LIST OF FMS CREDIT RECIPIENTS. WE CURRENTLY HAVE GRANT MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAMS WITH SEVEN AFRICAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING ZAIRE, SUDAN AND KENYA.

-- IN ADDITION, THE U.S. IS PROVIDING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO 33 COUNTRIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, AMOUNTING TO ABOUT DOLS 229 MILLION DURING THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR. MAJOR AID RECIPIENTS ARE ZAMBIA, BOTSWANA, AND KENYA. WE ALSO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES TO AFRICA THROUGH SUCH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION AND THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND.

4. IF THE DISCUSSION PROVIDES OPPORTUNITY, YOU MIGHT ALSO FOLLOW UP POINT RE HELP EGYPT COULD RENDER TO NIGERIAN PEACE INITIATIVE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

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-- THE SHABA ISSUE IS ONLY THE MOST RECENT AND MOST DRAMATIC CHALLENGE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN AFRICA. WE STRONGLY SHARE THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CUBANS IN AFRICA - AND ARE EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE APPARENTLY STEPPED UP PACE OF SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

-- IN LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, IT SEEMS TO US THAT THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY NOW FOR EGYPT TO EMPLOY ITS WIDE-SPREAD DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE IN AFRICA TO ENCOURAGE A CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. THE TIME MAY BE RIPE FOR STRENGTHENING IN A MEANINGFUL WAY THE MEDIATION AND PEACEKEEPING ROLE OF THE OAU. THIS CAN ONLY COME ABOUT IF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS GENERATE PRESSURE WITHIN THE OAU TO MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION. CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SUMMARIES, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 17-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE112807
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: NEA/EGY:GRBEYER:CEK
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770175-0422
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197705110/baaaevyo.tel
Line Count: 262
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 276be888-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26-Jan-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2345893
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA
TAGS: PFOR, XA
To: CAIRO
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/276be888-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009